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Simple posted pricing mechanisms
for selling a divisible item∗
Ioannis Caragiannis† Apostolis Kerentzis‡
Abstract
We study the problem of selling a divisible item to agents who have concave valuation
functions for fractions of the item. This is a fundamental problem with apparent applications
to pricing communication bandwidth or cloud computing services. We focus on simple
sequential posted pricing mechanisms that use linear pricing, i.e., a fixed price for the whole
item and proportional prices for fractions of it. We present results of the following form that
can be thought of as analogs of the well-known prophet inequality of Samuel-Cahn (1984).
For ρ ≈ 32%, if there is a linear pricing so that sequential posted pricing sells a ρ-fraction
of the item, this results in a ρ-approximation of the optimal social welfare. The value of ρ
can be improved to approximately 42% if sequential posted pricing considers the agents in
random order. We also show that the best linear pricing yields an expected revenue that is at
most O(κ2) times smaller than the optimal one, where κ is a bound on the curvature of the
valuation functions. The proof extends and exploits the approach of Alaei et al. (2019) and
bounds the revenue gap by the objective value of a mathematical program. The dependence
of the revenue gap on κ is unavoidable as a lower bound of Ω(lnκ) indicates.
1 Introduction
Selling a single item to potential buyers is a popular problem in microeconomics, with amazing
related discoveries during the last sixty years. In the most standard model, there are n potential
buyers (the agents), with private values for the item. The celebrated Vickrey auction [33] is
optimal with respect to social welfare, in the sense that the agent who values the item the
most gets it. Revenue maximization is possible when agents draw their private values from
independent probability distributions. Statistical information about these distributions is known
to the seller, who can use it and run the ideal auction to sell the item (and maximize her expected
revenue). Such revenue-maximizing auctions were first presented (among other results) in the
seminal paper of Myerson [26].
Even though welfare- and revenue-maximizing auctions are success stories (see [14] for a
detailed coverage), the corresponding auctions are relatively complex and usually far from the
ones used in practice. A different format of intermediate complexity is known as sequential
posted pricing [8]. According to it, the seller approaches the buyers in some order and proposes
a price to each of them. When approached, a buyer can either refuse to buy if the proposed
price exceeds her value for the item (and the process continues with the next buyer), or buy the
item at the proposed price (in this case, the process stops). In general, sequential posted pricing
can become notoriously complex (pricing in the airline industry is an annoying example from
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practice) as the best possible price for an agent can depend on statistical information about
the agents’ valuations and on the decisions of agents that were approched previously. However,
sequential posted pricing usually works very well when the same anonymous price (computed
using statistical information about the valuations) is proposed to all agents.
A well-known result by Samuel-Cahn [29], known as the prophet inequality, assumes agents
drawing their values from independent probability distributions and states a simple but remark-
able result with numerous applications: if there is a price in which the probability that some
agent will buy the item at a sequential posted pricing process is 1/2, then the same process
yields a 50% of the optimal social welfare. Constant approximations to optimal revenue (or a
constant revenue gap) by sequential posted pricing with an anonymous price is possible under a
regularity assumption for the valuations. Such statements (e.g., in [16]) usually read as follows:
for any set of buyers who draw their valuations from independent and regular probability distri-
butions, there is a price depending only on these distributions that yields an expected revenue
that is a constant fraction of the expected revenue returned by Myerson’s auction.
In this work, we deviate from the above setting and assume that the item is perfectly divisible.
So, different agents can get fractions of the item while some fraction of the item can stay unsold.
Agent behavior is more refined now. Each agent is still interested in obtaining the whole item
but gets value from fractions of it as well. In particular, we assume that each agent has a
valuation function that indicates the value of the agent for fractions of the item between 0
and 1. Concavity is a typical assumption here, corresponding to non-increasing marginal value.
Pricing of a divisible item can become very complicated in this setting. For example, the seller
can define different prices for different fractions of the item and could further discriminate
among agents.
We are interested in the design of simple sequential posted pricing mechanisms that specif-
ically use linear pricing. In particular, we restrict pricing to a fixed price for the whole item
and proportional prices for fractions. Do simple prophet inequality statements, like the one
of Samuel-Cahn [29] mentioned above, hold in this setting? Do such mechanisms have nearly-
optimal revenue? These are the two questions that we study.
For the first question, we show the following results, which are similar in spirit to the
prophet inequality of Samuel-Cahn. If there is a linear pricing that results in selling an expected
fraction of approximately 32% of the item using sequential posted pricing, this yields a 32%-
approximation to the social welfare. This result holds for any sequential posted pricing ordering.
For random orderings, the guarantee improves to 42%. Regarding revenue, we show that the best
linear pricing recovers a fraction of optimal revenue that depends polynomially on a curvature
measure of the valuations functions. In particular, this revenue gap is a small constant when
the valuation functions are close to linear. Such a dependency is shown to be unavoidable, as a
logarithmic lower bound shows.
When comparing the welfare of sequential posted pricing to the optimal one, we follow a
standard approach in the price of anarchy literature (e.g., see [28] for a survey that focuses on
auctions). The contribution of every agent to the welfare is split into two parts: the utility of
the agent and her payment. As agents are utility maximizers, the important information that
allows to compare to the optimal social welfare is that alternative decisions similar to the ones
in a welfare-maximizing allocation are not profitable for the agent. The idea that has made
the particular bounds possible is to consider many different alternative decisions (also called
deviations in the price of anarchy literature), each with a different weight. This idea has been
used in the analysis of auctions in the past (e.g., in [3, 4, 10, 31, 32]). To the best of our
knowledge, it is used to prove prophet-inequality-type results for the first time.
Bounding the revenue is even more challenging. First, our setting deviates from the single-
parameter environment of an indivisible single item and agents with single-valued valuations
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for it. Consequently, Myerson’s characterization of the revenue-maximizing allocation does not
carry over. To tackle this issue, we resort to the approach of Alaei et al. [2], who use the notion
of an ex-ante relaxation previously considered in [1, 7]. Instead of comparing the revenue of the
best linear pricing to the optimal revenue, we compare to the best possible revenue of an ex-ante
relaxation of the original problem, in which an expected fraction of at most 1 is sold to agents.
We are able to formulate the question of the gap between the two revenues as a mathematical
program that has similarities to the one of [2] and allows us to use the result of [2] as a black
box. Our result shows that the revenue gap is at most O(κ2), where κ is the maximum ratio
of the slope of a valuation function at point 0 over its value at point 1. Our lower bound of
Ω(lnκ) is shown on a single valuation function, indicating that high curvature of valuations is
not compatible with high revenue.
1.1 Related work
As mentioned above, our work on social welfare is related to the literature on prophet inequal-
ities in optimal stopping theory. The first prophet inequalities were obtained by Krengel and
Sucheston [21, 22] while the result of Samuel-Cahn [29] mentioned above is the most related
to ours in the sense that it uses a simple threshold strategy. In the TCS literature, prophet
inequalities were first studied by Hajiaghayi et al. [13] and have since been proved very useful
in social welfare maximization in quite complex domains (e.g., see [1, 11, 12, 20]) as well as in
revenue maximization [7, 8]. The survey by Lucier [24] provides an excellent overview of these
results. A result of Duetting et al. [11] implies a close to 50% approximation of optimal social
welfare in our setting. However, it does not correspond to linear pricing. We remark that a
50% approximation is best possible by adapting a folklore lower bound on prophet inequalities
(e.g., see [24]).
Sequential posted pricing with an anonymous price has received much attention recently.
Alaei et al. [2] prove that this mechanism achieves a constant approximation of 2.72 of the
optimal revenue. They use a general strategy that we discuss in more detail later in Section 4.
The tight bound of 2.62 follows by two recent papers by Jin et al. [16, 17]. We remark that all
results for anonymous pricing carry over to our setting if the valuation functions are restricted
to be linear. Indeed, the behavior of an agent with a linear valuation function against a linear
pricing with a price of p per unit is either to buy the whole item if her value for the whole item
is higher than p or refuse to buy otherwise. We mostly focus on non-linear valuation functions
where divisibility differentiates our problem a lot.
In the economics literature, divisible items have received attention, with the focus being
mostly on whether bundling can be beneficial or not [27] and on how to structure the sale as
many auctions of shares [34]. Perfect divisibility is considered in [23, 30]. In another more related
direction, the operations research community has considered resource allocation mechanisms to
divide an item based on signals received by the agents, that are further used to impose payments
to the agents. Among them, the proportional mechanism, first defined by Kelly [19] and analyzed
by Johari and Tsitsiklis [18] is the most popular one. Even though its social welfare has been
analyzed extensively in stochastic settings that are very similar to ours [18, 5, 9] (see also [6]
and the references therein), no revenue guarantees are known.
1.2 Roadmap
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We begin with preliminary definitions and
notation in Section 2. Our results for the social welfare appear in Section 3 and for the revenue
in Section 4. We conclude with a short discussion on open problems in Section 5.
3
2 Preliminaries
We denote by n the number of agents and use the integers in set [n] = {1, 2, ..., n} to identify
them. A valuation function for agent i is a monotone non-decreasing concave function vi :
[0, 1] → R≥0. We assume that each agent i draws her valuation function vi, independently
from the other agents, from a publicly known probability distribution Fi. We use F to denote
the product distribution F1×F2×... × Fn. We denote by v = 〈v1, v2, ..., vn〉 a vector of the
valuation functions of the agents (or valuation profile) and write v ∼ F to denote that such
a vector is drawn at random according to the joint probability distribution F. We use the
standard notation v−i to refer to the subvector of v that consists of the valuation functions of
all agents besides agent i.
We consider sequential posted pricing mechanisms that use linear pricing with a price p per
unit and an ordering pi of the agents (i.e., a permutation of the elements in [n]). The ordering
pi defines the order in which the agents act. We use the notation j ≻pi i to indicate that agent
i acts prior to agent j according to pi. The notation j pi i allows the possibility that j = i.
When it is agent i’s turn to act, she can buy any fraction of the item that has not been given
to agents that acted before her at a price of p per unit of the item purchased. We assume that
agents are utility maximizers. Agent i has a utility of vi(z)− p · z when buying a fraction of z
at price p per unit. Since the valuation function vi is concave, the utility derivative v
′
i(z) − p
is a monotone non-increasing function. Hence, if a fraction of α of the item is available when
it is agent i’s turn to act, she will either buy a fraction of z that nullifies the derivative of her
utility, i.e., v′i(z) = p, or a fraction of 0 if v
′
i(0) < p, or the whole remaining item if v
′
i(α) > p.
For a valuation profile v, we denote by yi(v, p, pi) the fraction of the item that agent i buys
at price p per unit when her turn comes according to the ordering pi. We also denote by y∗i (vi, p)
the fraction of the item agent i would get at price p per unit if she were the only agent competing
for the item. By the discussion above, we have
yi(v, p, pi) =


y∗i (vi, p), if
∑
jpii
y∗i (vi, p) ≤ 1
1−
∑
j≻pii
y∗i (vi, p), if
∑
j≻pii
y∗i (vi, p) ≤ 1 <
∑
jpii
y∗i (vi, p)
0, if
∑
j≻pii
y∗i (vi, p) > 1
Hence,
∑
j∈[n]
yj(v, p, pi) = min

1,
∑
j∈[n]
y∗j (vj, p)

 . (1)
We denote by ui(v, p, pi) = vi(yi(v, p, pi)) − p · yi(v, p, pi) the utility of agent i. We also
use SW(v, p, pi) =
∑
i∈[n] vi(yi(v, p, pi)) for the social welfare achieved by the execution of the
mechanism. We also denote by xi(v) the fraction of the item that agent i gets in an social
welfare-maximizing assignment and by SW∗(v) =
∑
i∈[n] vi(xi(v)) the optimal social welfare.
Clearly, the optimal social welfare depends only on the valuation profile and not on the price
p or the ordering pi. The sub-optimality of the social welfare achieved by the mechanism is
actually due to these latter two characteristics.
We denote by REV(v, p, pi) = p ·
∑
i∈[n] yi(v, p, pi) the revenue of the mechanism. We do not
define the optimal revenue here; this definition will be given implicitly in Section 4 together
with a refinement of the setting as described above and additional notions.
3 Approximating the optimal social welfare
We first present our results for social welfare. We distinguish between mechanisms that use
adversarial (worst-case) and random ordering. In the analysis of both mechanisms, we use
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the following lemma which bounds the expected utility of an agent by her contribution to the
optimal social welfare. The proof follows by comparing the decision of the agent with several
alternative ones that are defined in terms of her decision in a hypothetical welfare-maximizing
allocation of the item.
Lemma 1. For every agent i, price p per unit, ordering pi, and β > 0, it holds:
E
v∼F
[ui(v, p, pi)]
≥ β
(
E
v∼F
[vi (xi(v))]− p E
v∼F
[xi(v)]
)
·

1− e−1/β − ∫ 1−e−1/β
0
Pr
v∼F

∑
j≻pii
y∗j (vj , p) ≥ t

 d t

 .
Proof. Observe that the rightmost parenthesis in the expression above is non-negative. If the
leftmost parenthesis is negative, the lemma clearly follows. In the following, we assume that
Ev∼F[vi (xi(v))] ≥ p · Ev∼F[xi(v)].
Let v be a vector of valuation functions and t ∈ [0, 1]. Recall that when
∑
j≻pii
y∗j (vj , p) ≤ t,
a fraction of at least 1− t of the item is unallocated when it is agent i’s turn to act. Since agent
i prefers a fraction of yi(v, p, pi) to a fraction of (1− t)Ev′−i∼F−i [xi(vi,v
′
−i)], we have
ui(v, p, pi) ≥ vi
(
(1− t) E
v
′
−i∼F−i
[xi(vi,v
′
−i)]
)
− (1− t) · p E
v
′
−i∼F−i
[xi(vi,v
′
−i)]
≥ (1− t) E
v
′
−i∼F−i
[vi
(
xi(vi,v
′
−i)
)
]− (1− t) · p E
v
′
−i∼F−i
[xi(vi,v
′
−i)]. (2)
The second inequality follows by Jensen inequality due to the concavity of function vi.
Clearly, Ev∼F[ui(v, p, pi)] ≥ Ev∼F
[
ui(v, p, pi)1
{∑
j≻pii
y∗j (vj , p) ≤ t
}]
for every t ∈ [0, 1].
Furthermore, observe that β
∫ 1−e−1/β
0
d t
1−t = 1. Using these observations and inequality (2), we
have
E
v∼F
[ui(v, p, pi)]
≥ β
∫ 1−e−1/β
0
E
v∼F

ui(v, p, pi)1


∑
j≻pii
y∗j (vj , p) ≤ t



 d t
1− t
≥ β
∫ 1−e−1/β
0
E
v∼F

( E
v
′
−i∼F−i
[vi
(
xi(vi,v
′
−i)
)
]− p E
v
′
−i∼F−i
[xi(vi,v
′
−i)]
)
1


∑
j≻pii
y∗j (vj , p) ≤ t



 d t
= β
∫ 1−e−1/β
0
E
vi∼Fi
[
E
v
′
−i∼F−i
[vi
(
xi(vi,v
′
−i)
)
]− p E
v
′
−i∼F−i
[xi(vi,v
′
−i)]
]
· Pr
v∼F

∑
j≻pii
y∗j (vj , p) ≤ t

 d t
≥ β
(
E
v∼F
[vi (xi(v))]− p E
v∼F
[xi(v)]
)
·

1− e−1/β − ∫ 1−e−1/β
0
Pr
v∼F

∑
j≻pii
y∗j (vj , p) ≥ t

 d t

 .
The equality follows since the quantity Ev′−i∼F−i [vi
(
xi(vi,v
′
−i)
)
] − pEv′−i∼F−i [xi(vi,v
′
−i)]
does not depend on the condition
∑
j≻pii
y∗j (vj , p) ≤ t. The last inequality follows since
Ev∼F[vi (xi(v))] ≥ pEv∼F[xi(v)].
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3.1 Using an adversarial ordering
Our first main result for the social welfare is the following.
Theorem 2. Let β be such that e1/β = 2+1/β, i.e., β ≈ 0.872453, and ρ1 = e
−1/β ≈ 0.317844.
Let p be such that the mechanism with linear posted pricing that uses price p per unit and
processes the agents in any order satisfies Ev∼F[
∑
i∈[n] yi(v, p, pi)] = ρ1. Then, this mechanism
yields a ρ1-approximation of the optimal social welfare.
Proof. To prove the theorem, we will bound the expected utility of agent i as follows:
E
v∼F
[ui(v, p, pi)] ≥ ρ1 E
v∼F
[vi(xi(v))] − ρ1 · p E
v∼F
[xi(v)]. (3)
Then, we will have
E
v∼F
[SW(v, p, pi)] = E
v∼F

∑
i∈[n]
vi(yi(v, p, pi))


= E
v∼F

∑
i∈[n]
(vi(yi(v, p, pi))− p · yi(v, p, pi))

+ p · E
v∼F

∑
i∈[n]
yi(v, p, pi)


=
∑
i∈[n]
E
v∼F
[ui(v, p, pi)] + ρ1 · p
≥ ρ1
∑
i∈[n]
E
v∼F
[vi(xi(v))]− ρ1 · p
∑
i∈[n]
E
v∼F
[xi(v)] + ρ1 · p
= ρ1 E
v∼F
[SW∗(v)].
The last equality follows by linearity of expectation and since
∑
i∈[n] xi(v) = 1 for every valua-
tion vector v.
To show inequality (3), we assume that Ev∼F[vi(xi(v))]−pEv∼F[xi(v)] is non-negative (ob-
serve that (3) trivially holds otherwise) and use Lemma 1. Using the property
∫ α
0 Pr[X ≥ t] d t =
E[min{α,X}] for every non-negative random variable X and equation (1), we have
∫ 1−e−1/β
0
Pr
v∼F

∑
j≻pii
y∗j (vj , p) ≥ t

d t ≤ ∫ 1−e−1/β
0
Pr
v∼F

∑
j∈[n]
y∗j (vj, p) ≥ t

 d t
= E
v∼F

min

1− e−1/β ,
∑
j∈[n]
y∗j (vj , p)




≤ E
v∼F

∑
j∈[n]
yj(v, p, pi)

 = e−1/β . (4)
By our assumption that Ev∼F[vi(xi(v))]−pEv∼F[xi(v)] is non-negative, Lemma 1 and inequality
(4) yield
E
v∼F
[ui(v, p, pi)] ≥ β(1 − 2e
−1/β)
(
E
v∼F
[vi (xi(v))]− p E
v∼F
[xi(v)]
)
= ρ1 E
v∼F
[vi (xi(v))]− ρ1 · p E
v∼F
[xi(v)],
as desired. The last equality follows by the definition of β and ρ1.
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3.2 Using a random ordering
Now, we assume that the mechanism selects the ordering pi uniformly at random among all
permutations of [n]. We denote by Π this probability distribution. In addition to Lemma 1,
the proof of the main result of this section (Theorem 4) uses the following technical lemma.
Lemma 3. For every agent i, price p per unit, and α > 0, it holds:
E
v∼F
pi∼Π

min{α,∑
j≻pii
y∗j (vj , p)}

 ≤ max{α, 1/2} E
v∼F
pi∼Π

∑
j∈[n]
yj(v, p, pi)

 .
Proof. For every permutation pi of [n], denote by pi′ its reverse. Then, using the fact that each
permutation is selected equiprobably by Π and equation (1), we have
E
v∼F
pi∼Π

min{α,∑
j≻pii
y∗j (vj , p)}

 = E
v∼F
pi∼Π

1
2
min{α,
∑
j≻pii
y∗j (vj, p)}+
1
2
min{α,
∑
j≻pi′ i
y∗j (vj , p)}


≤ E
v∼F
pi∼Π

min{α, 1
2
∑
j∈[n]\{i}
y∗j (vj , p)}


≤ max{α, 1/2} E
v∼F
pi∼Π

min{1, ∑
j∈[n]
y∗j (vj, p)}


= max{α, 1/2} E
v∼F
pi∼Π

∑
j∈[n]
yj(v, p, pi)

 ,
as desired.
Theorem 4. Let ρ2 = (1 + 2 ln 2)
−1 ≈ 0.41906 and p be such that the mechanism with linear
posted pricing that uses price p per unit and processes the agents in a random order satis-
fies Ev∼F,pi∼Π[
∑
i∈[n] yi(v, p, pi)] = ρ2. Then, this mechanism yields a ρ2-approximation of the
optimal social welfare.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2. We will bound the expected utility of agent
i as follows:
E
v∼F
pi∼Π
[ui(v, p, pi)] ≥ ρ2 E
v∼F
[vi(xi(v))]− ρ2 · p E
v∼F
[xi(v)]. (5)
Then, by expressing the contribution of each agent to the social welfare as the sum of her utility
and her payment, we will have
E
v∼F
pi∼Π
[SW(v, p, pi)] = E
v∼F
pi∼Π

∑
i∈[n]
vi(yi(v, p, pi))


= E
v∼F
pi∼Π

∑
i∈[n]
(vi(yi(v, p, pi)) − p · yi(v, p, pi))

+ p · E
v∼F
pi∼Π

∑
i∈[n]
yi(v, p, pi)


=
∑
i∈[n]
E
v∼F
pi∼Π
[ui(v, p, pi)] + ρ2 · p
7
≥ ρ2
∑
i∈[n]
E
v∼F
[vi(xi(v))]− ρ2 · p
∑
i∈[n]
E
v∼F
[xi(v)] + ρ2 · p
= ρ2 E
v∼F
[SW∗(v)].
The last equality follows by linearity of expectation and since
∑
i∈[n] xi(v) = 1 for every valua-
tion vector v.
To show inequality (5), we assume that Ev∼F[vi(xi(v))] − pEv∼F[xi(v)] is non-negative
(observe that (5) trivially holds otherwise) and use Lemma 1 with β = 1ln 2 . Using the property∫ α
0 Pr[X ≥ t] d t = E[min{α,X}] for every non-negative random variable X, we have
∫ 1/2
0
Pr
v∼F
pi∼Π

∑
j≻pii
y∗j (vj , p) ≥ t

 d t = E
v∼F
pi∼Π

min

1/2,
∑
j≻pii
y∗j (vj , p)




≤
1
2
· E
v∼F
pi∼Π

∑
j∈[n]
yj(v, p, pi)

 = ρ2
2
. (6)
By our assumption that Ev∼F[vi(xi(v))]−pEv∼F[xi(v)] is non-negative, Lemma 1 with β =
1
ln 2
and inequality (6) yield
E
v∼F
pi∼Π
[ui(v, p, pi)] ≥ β
(
1− e−1/β −
ρ2
2
)(
E
v∼F
[vi (xi(v))]− p E
v∼F
[xi(v)]
)
= ρ2 E
v∼F
[vi (xi(v))]− ρ2 · p E
v∼F
[xi(v)],
as desired. The last equality follows by the definition of β and ρ2.
4 Approximating the optimal revenue
For convenience, we assume that the valuation functions that are drawn by the agents are
differentiable in [0, 1] and have bounded curvature. In particular, we use the ratio v′(0)/v(1)
as a measure of a curvature of the valuation function v and consider agents that draw random
valuation functions with curvature at most κ ≥ 1. Then, the approximations of optimal revenue
we present are expressed as functions of κ.
As results in anonymous pricing mechanisms imply (see, e.g., [2]), reasonable revenue ap-
proximations are not possible if the valuation functions do not satisfy a regularity condition. In
the classical setting of selling an indivisible item, each agent i has a scaller valuation vi drawn
from a probability distribution wth regular commulative density function Hi. Regularity means
that the revenue-quantile curve q · H−1i (1 − q) is concave in q. In our setting, valuations are
not scalars but functions, so the regularity assumption needs to be extended. One modeling
assumption that has been followed in [30] is to define valuation functions as vi(z) = ti · hi(z)
with a scalar part ti and a function part hi(z). The function part is known to the seller and
can be used by the mechanism. The scalar part is drawn from a probability distribution, in
which regularity can be imposed. This is essentially a single-parameter environment, where it
is a simple exercise to apply Myerson’s approach [26] of maximizing revenue by maximizing
virtual welfare. This means that revenue-optimal mechanisms have a well-known structure in
this setting.
The setting we consider is multi-parameter and more general than the one we just described.
For every agent i ∈ [n] and every x ∈ [0, 1], we assume that the derivative value v′i(x) of the
concave valuation function is drawn from a regular probability distribution with cummulative
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density function Fi,x. In our case, regularity means that the revenue-quantile curve q ·F
−1
i,x (1−q)
is concave in q for every agent and every x ∈ [0, 1]. Unfortunately, Myerson’s machinery
cannot be applied in our setting, so we do not have any clean form of the revenue-maximizing
mechanism. This makes the proof of our main result for the revenue gap that follows more
challenging.
Theorem 5. The revenue gap when selling a divisible item to n agents with valuations of
maximum curvature κ ≥ 1 using linear pricing is at most O(κ2).
4.1 Interlude: a quick overview of the approach of Alaei et al. [2]
To bound the maximum revenue gap, we adapt the approach of [2] for selling an indivisible item
using sequential posted pricing and an anonymous price.
Alaei et al. [2] use the mathematical program below to bound the gap between the optimal
expected revenue and the best expected revenue that can be achieved with an anonymous price.
Actually, instead of comparing directly to the optimal revenue (in fact, this is done in follow-up
work by Jin et al. [16]), they compare to the best possible revenue of the ex-ante relaxation,
i.e., the maximum expected revenue that can be achieved by a mechanism that sells the item
to at most one agent in expectation. Their mathematical program uses as variables (1) the
regular cummulative density function Hi of the valuation of agent i for the item and (2) the
probability ri that the item is given to agent i in the revenue-maximizing allocation for the
ex-ante relaxation.
maximize
∑
i∈[n]
riH
−1
i (1− ri) (7)
subject to
∑
i∈[n]
ri ≤ 1
p

1− ∏
i∈[n]
Hi(p)

 ≤ R,∀p > R
ri ∈ [0, 1],∀i ∈ [n]
Hi is a regular cdf,∀i ∈ [n]
Viewed together with the first constraint, the objective of mathematical program (7) is to
maximize the revenue of the ex-ante relaxation. The second set of constraints implements the
restriction that no anonymous pricing p yields a revenue higher than R. The ratio between the
objective value of (7) and R is an upper bound to the revenue gap. The main result of [2] is as
follows.
Theorem 6 (Alaei et al. [2]). For every R ≥ 1, the objective value of the mathematical program
(7) is at most e · R.
Our proof of the revenue gap when selling a divisible item with linear pricing will use the
result of [2] as a black box. We remark that the original result in [2] uses specifically R = 1.
The extension we consider here is without loss of generality and is used for simplicity of our
exposition.
4.2 A mathematical program for the revenue gap
Let us now return to our setting. We also use an ex-ante relaxation to upper-bound the optimal
revenue and to relate it to the maximum revenue that can be achieved with linear pricing. Let
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us consider pricing functions pi : [0, 1]→ R
+ for each agent i ∈ [n] that maximize the revenue of
the ex-ante relaxation. For every agent i ∈ [n] and every x ∈ [0, 1], let qi(x) be the probability
that a fraction of at least x is bought by agent i with optimal pricing. For i ∈ [n] and x ∈ [0, 1],
observe that agent i will get a fraction of at least x if her utility derivative is non-negative at
point x, i.e., v′i(x) ≥ p
′
i(x). Hence, qi(x) = Pr[v
′
i(x) ≥ p
′
i(x)] = 1−Fi,x(p
′
i(x)) and, equivalently,
p′i(x) = F
−1
i,x (1 − qi(x)). Using the quantities qi(x) and p
′
i(x), we can express the expected
payment by agent i as
∫ 1
0 qi(x)p
′
i(x) d x =
∫ 1
0 qi(x)F
−1
i,x (1− qi(x)) d x. Intuitively, qi(x) denotes
the probability that agent i buys her x-th point of the item, p′i(x) denotes the payment increase
due to this point, and the quantity qi(x)F
−1
i,x (1−qi(x)) represents its contribution to the revenue.
Hence, denoting by E[REV∗(v)] the optimal expected revenue for our original problem, we get
E[REV∗(v)] ≤
∑
i∈[n]
∫ 1
0
qi(x)F
−1
i,x (1− qi(x)) d x. (8)
The constraint
∑
i∈[n]
∫ 1
0
qi(x) dx ≤ 1 (9)
requires that, on average, no more than the whole item is available for purchase by the agents,
and thus guarantees that the RHS of equation (8) is indeed the revenue of the ex-ante relaxation.
Our next step is to include additional constraints for bounding the revenue obtained by any
linear pricing. We will need the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Let X1, X2, ..., Xk be random variables with Xi ∈ [0, 1] for i ∈ [k] and let X =∑
i∈[k]Xi. Then, E[min{1,X}] ≥ 1−
∏
i∈[k] (1− E[Xi]).
Proof. We claim that E[min{1,X}] is minimized when X1, X2, ..., Xk are Bernoulli random
variables. Then, it will be
E[min{1,X}] = 1−
∏
i∈[k]
Pr[Xi = 0] = 1−
∏
i∈[k]
(1− E[Xi]),
and the lemma will follow.
To prove this claim, we show that by replacing the random variable Xk with the Bernoulli
random variable Yk with Pr[Yk = 1] = E[Xk] and Pr[Yk = 0] = 1 − E[Xk] the expectation
E[min{1,X}] can only become smaller. The claim will follow by repeating this argument and
replacing each random variable Xi with a Bernoulli one that has the same expectation.
Formally, let Y = X1 + ... + Xk−1 + Yk = X
′ + Yk; we will show that E[min{1,X}] ≥
E[min{1, Y }]. Denoting by G the cdf of the random variable Yk, we have that, conditioned on
X ′ = w, the expected contribution of Xk to min{1,X} is
E[min{1,X} −X ′|X ′ = w] =
∫ 1−w
0
(1−G(z)) d z ≥ (1− w)
∫ 1
0
(1−G(z)) d z
= (1− w)E[Xk] = (1−w) Pr[Yk = 1] = E[min{1, Y } −X
′|X ′ = w].
The inequality follows since 1−G(z) is non-increasing in z and, subsequently,
∫ t
0 (1−G(z)) d z
is concave in t and has no point below the line t
∫ t
0 (1−G(z)) d z for t ∈ [0, 1]. Denoting the
pdf of the random variable X ′ by f , we have
E[min{1,X}] =
∫ 1
0
f(w)(w + E[min{1,X} −X ′|X ′ = w]) dw
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≥∫ 1
0
f(w)(w + E[min{1, Y } −X ′|X ′ = w]) dw
= E[min{1, Y }],
as desired.
By applying Lemma 7 with k = n, Xi = y
∗
i (vi, p) for i ∈ [n] and using equation (1), we have
that the expected revenue at a price p per unit using an ordering pi of the agents is
E[REV(v, p, pi)] = p · E
v∼F

∑
i∈[n]
yi(v, p, pi)


= p · E
v∼F

min

1,
∑
i∈[n]
y∗i (vi, p)




≥ p ·

1− ∏
i∈[n]
(
1− E
vi∼Fi
[y∗i (vi, p)]
) . (10)
To determine the revenue gap, we can require that any linear pricing with price per unit p
has revenue at most 1 and ask: “how large can the revenue of the optimal ex-ante relaxation
can be?” Bounding the RHS of (10) is sufficient for bounding the revenue of linear pricing
by 1. Then, the maximum value the optimal revenue can get is upper-bounded by the value
the RHS of (8) can get under the constraint (9). So, we will bound the revenue gap using the
following mathematical program that has as variables the cdf’s Fi,x(t) for i ∈ [n], x ∈ [0, 1] and
t ∈ [0,+∞) and the probabilities qi(x) for i ∈ [n] and x ∈ [0, 1]:
maximize
∑
i∈[n]
∫ 1
0
qi(x)F
−1
i,x (1− qi(x)) dx (11)
subject to
∑
i∈[n]
∫ 1
0
qi(x) dx ≤ 1
p ·

1− ∏
i∈[n]
(
1− E
vi∼Fi
[y∗i (vi, p)]
) ≤ 1,∀p > 1
qi(x) ∈ [0, 1],∀i ∈ [n], x ∈ [0, 1]
Fi,x is a regular cdf,∀i ∈ [n], x ∈ [0, 1]
4.3 Bounding the objective value of the mathematical program
We now prove an upper bound on the objective value of mathematical program (11) by relating
it to mathematical program (7), and exploiting the revenue gap of [2] for anonymous item
pricing (Theorem 6).
Our main tool is the following transformation. We use the notation (q,F) as abbreviation
for the probabilities qi(x) for every agent i ∈ [n] and x ∈ [0, 1] and the cummulative density
functions Fi,x(t) for every agent i ∈ [n], x ∈ [0, 1], and t ≥ 0. Given the pair (q,F), we define
ri =
∫ 1
0 qi(x) d x and Hi(t) = Fi,0(2κt) for every agent i ∈ [n] and t ≥ 0, and use the pair (r,H)
as their abbreviation.
Bounding the objective value of mathematical program (11) has two steps; the first one is
implemented by the next lemma.
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Lemma 8. Given a feasible solution (q,F) of the mathematical program (11), the solution
(r,H) is a feasible solution of the mathematical program (7) with R = 2κ− 1.
Proof. Clearly, the solution (r,H) satisfies the first constraint of the mathematical program
(7) since (q,F) satisfies the first constraint of (11). In the following, we show that the second
constraint is satisfied as well. We will need two technical lemmas.
Lemma 9. Let k be an integer and 0 ≤ z1, z2, ..., zk ≤ 1. Then, for every t ∈ (0, 1), it holds
that
1−
∏
i∈[k]
(1− t · zi) ≥ t

1− ∏
i∈[k]
(1− zi)


Proof. It suffices to show that the LHS is concave as a function of t; then it is at least as high
as the line that connects points (0, 0) and (1, 1 −
∏
i∈[k] (1− zi)), i.e., the RHS of the above
inequality. Indeed, the first derivative of the LHS is equal to∏
i∈[k]
(1− t · zi) ·
∑
i∈[k]
zi
1− t · zi
and its second derivative is equal to
−
∏
i∈[k]
(1− t · zi)



∑
i∈[k]
zi
1− t · zi


2
−
∑
i∈[k]
(
zi
1− t · zi
)2 < 0,
as desired.
Lemma 10. For every agent i ∈ [n] and any price p, it holds that Evi∼Fi [y
∗
i (vi, p)] ≥
1−Hi(p)
2κ−1 .
Proof. Assume that v′i(0) ≥ 2κp; hence, vi(1) ≥ 2p. By the definition of y
∗
i (vi, p), we have that
v′i(z) ≤ p for z ≥ y
∗
i (vi, p). Hence,
vi(y
∗(vi, p)) ≥ vi(1)− v
′
i(y
∗
i (vi, p)) · (1− y
∗
i (vi, p)) ≥ vi(1) − p · (1− y
∗
i (vi, p)) (12)
Furthermore, by our assumption on the curvature of the valuation functions, v′i(z) ≤ κ · vi(1)
for z ≤ y∗i (vi, p). Hence,
vi(y
∗(vi, p)) ≤ κ · vi(1) · y
∗(vi, p). (13)
Now, (12) and (13) yield
y∗(vi, p) ≥
vi(1) − p
κ · vi(1) − p
≥
1
2κ − 1
.
Thus,
E
vi∼Fi
[y∗i (vi, p)] ≥ E
vi∼Fi
[y∗i (vi, p)1{v
′
i(0) ≥ 2κp}] ≥
1− Fi,0(2κp)
2κ− 1
=
1−Hi(p)
2κ− 1
.
Now, using the second constraint of the mathematical program (11) for p > 2κ−1, Lemma 9
and Lemma 10, we have
1 ≥ p

1− ∏
i∈[n]
(
1− E
vi∼Fi
[y∗i (vi, p)]
)
12
≥ p

1− ∏
i∈[n]
(
1−
1−Hi(p)
2κ− 1
)
≥
p
2κ− 1

1− ∏
i∈[n]
Hi(p)

 ,
i.e., equivalently,
p

1− ∏
i∈[n]
Hi(p)

 ≤ R,∀p > R,
with R = 2κ− 1, as the second contstraint of the mathematical program (7) requires.
The second step of our proof is to relate the objective values of the two mathematical
programs (11) and (7).
Lemma 11. The objective value of the mathematical program (11) at solution (q,F) is at most
2κ times the objective value of the mathematical program (7) with R = 2κ−1 at solution (r,H).
Proof. Notice that, by the definition of H, we have F−1i,0 (t) = 2κH
−1
i (t). Hence,∫ 1
0
qi(x)F
−1
i,x (1− qi(x)) d x ≤
∫ 1
0
qi(x)F
−1
i,0 (1− qi(x)) d x
≤
∫ 1
0
qi(x) d x · F
−1
i,0
(
1−
∫ 1
0
qi(x) d x
)
= 2κriH
−1
i (1− ri).
The first inequality follows by the concavity of valuations which implies F−1i,x (t) is non-increasing
in x. The second inequality follows by applying Jensen inequality; recall that, by the regularity
of v′i(0), the function q · F
−1
i,0 (1− q) is concave in q.
Theorem 5 now follows by Theorem 6 and Lemmas 8 and 11. Indeed, these three statements
imply a revenue gap of at most 2κ(2κ − 1)e.
4.4 A lower bound
We now show that a dependence of the revenue gap on κ is unavoidable.
Theorem 12. For every κ > 1, there exists a concave valuation function with curvature κ so
that any linear pricing recovers at most a 1/ρ-fraction of the optimal revenue, with ρ ≥ 1+lnκ.
Proof. Let ρ be such that ρ− ln ρ = 1 + lnκ and define the valuation function
v(x) =
{
κz, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1κρ
1 + 1ρ lnx,
1
κρ ≤ x ≤ 1
Clearly, v is concave with curvature κ. In particular, it is linear in [0, 1κρ ] and has stricty
decreasing derivative in [ 1κρ , 1]. Observe that the maximum fraction of the item that can be
sold at the price of κ is 1κρ . Also, the whole item is sold at price p < 1/ρ since v
′(1) = 1/ρ. At
price p ∈ [1/ρ, κ), the fraction x of the item that is sold is such that v′(x) = p, i.e., equal to
1
pρ . In every case, the revenue is at most 1/ρ. In contrast, a non-linear pricing p(x) = v(x) can
recover the whole value of 1 for the item as revenue.
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5 Open problems
Motivated by recent work on anonymous pricing for the standard setting of selling a single
(indivisible) item, we have explored the power of linear posted pricing when selling a perfectly
divisible item. Our work leaves several interesting open problems. Regarding social welfare,
can the parameters ρ1 and ρ2 in Theorems 2 and 4 be improved to 50%? Duetting et al. [11]
(see also the discussion in [24]) show that a 50% approximation to optimal social welfare is
possible using linear pricing when valuations are of the form vi(z) = vi ·min{z/si, 1} but their
techniques do not seem to yield the same bound with linear pricing for more general concave
valuation functions.
Our results on the revenue gap leave even more space for improvements. Clearly, it would be
interesting to determine the tight bound on the revenue gap for linear pricing, closing the gap
between O(κ2) and Ω(lnκ). More importantly, the optimal revenue for the ex-ante relaxation
of the multi-parameter setting in Section 4.2 could be used to bound the revenue gap of other
mechanisms for allocating a divisible item, such as the proportional mechanism [18, 19], which
has been extensively studied in terms of social welfare [5, 6, 9]. This could lead to results on
the Bayes-Nash price of anarchy for revenue which, with a few exceptions such as [3, 15, 25],
are rather sporadic in the literature.
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